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THE APPLICATION OF AN AGILE APPROACH TO IT SECURITY 
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR SMES  
 
Damien Hutchinson, Chris Armitt, Dean Edwards-Lear 
School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia  
Email: drh@deakin.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper demonstrates the application of an agile risk management approach to perform asset-based risk 
analysis to meet the information security requirements of SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises). This 
approach is proposed as an alternative to traditional methods that are cumbersome, resource intensive and 
costly, often hindering their value and use by SMEs. The organisation being studied is an Aged Care Facility 
(ACF) with legal and ethical responsibilities. Within the business there is little knowledge regarding potential 
information technology threats that could impact on these responsibilities. The ACF maintains a system 
containing client personal and medical records, network communications, as well as financial and business 
information assets. Understanding the susceptibility of this data to unauthorised access and/or exploitation has 
become a key concern for the organisation. In order to analyse and communicate potential risks to current IT 
assets and propose suggestions to mitigate and minimise risk factors, an agile IT security risk assessment 
approach was developed in a collaborative research venture with ACF and their External IT Provider (EIP).  
Keywords 
SMEs, Information Security, Risk Analysis, Agile, Aged Care organisations 
INTRODUCTION 
There are a wide variety of risk assessment methods and tools that currently exist in the world of IT security. A 
majority of them are more adaptable for large companies with adequate financial and personnel resources to 
accurately assess their IT security as opposed to SMEs with fewer resources. This section presents an overview 
of the various methodologies, risk assessment frameworks and other tools that currently exist. Their potential 
benefits for SMEs are discussed using the Aged Care Facility (ACF) as the case study, as well as any reasons 
why they may not be suitable.  
 
The problem was being able to determine and validate a suitable approach to perform the security risk 
assessment for Aged Care organisations that could then be justified as an agile model for SMEs. As part of the 
design process of this agile approach, workshops were conducted with an Aged Care organisation (refer to 
section Identification of Threats to Critical Assets). Based on conversation, observation and feedback during 
these workshops we determined that the suitable risk assessment approach for this ACF to undertake an 
independent risk analysis of their IT assets, needed to include the following criteria:  
 
1. Industry Sectors: To facilitate ACF representation and operation across a range of industry sectors, the 
method needs to facilitate public, private and government organizations. 
2. Language: The language of the method needs to be in English. 
3. Cost: The associated cost of obtaining the method needs to be free. 
4. Scope: The scope of the method must include usability by SMEs. 
5. Management Use Required: The method needs to focus on the ability of ACF management to use, 
understand and apply the method. 
6. Required Training: Maximum (2-3 days) training or guidance is required to skill an ACF to apply and 
use the method. 
7. Consultancy Support: Consultancy support should not be required in order to apply the method. 
8. Regulatory Compliance: The method needs to facilitate adaptability to changing regulatory 
compliance. 
9. Compliance to IT Standards: The risk assessment method needs to have been designed and developed 
based on industry recognised and certified principles and processes to allow for future alignment and 
compliance of ACF security with an IT standard. 
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To both validate the relevance of this empirical criteria and understand the suitability of current approaches 
available for SMEs, a review of risk assessment methods was undertaken. The review set out to determine 
whether there is a current industry or government body framework available for comparing risk assessment 
methods. It was discovered that the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), a 
centre of expertise for Information Security in Europe, has generated an inventory of Risk Management / Risk 
Assessment methods (ENISA, 2014). Currently, the inventory consists of 13 methods. To both describe and 
enable comparison between the characteristics of the methods, ENISA devised 21 attributes and formulated 
them into a template (ENISA, 2005). To assist SMEs with the selection of the most appropriate method, the 
ENISA working group selected 11 of those attributes and tabled them with 8 of the 13 risk assessment and risk 
management methods characterised by their features and functions which were judged to be best suited for 
SMEs (ENISA, 2006). Six correlations from the 11 attributes that match and substantiate the empirical criteria 
for the ACF case study were identified. Table 1 shows the relationship between the 8 methods and the empirical 
criteria to demonstrate the comparison performed and determine a suitable security risk assessment approach for 
ACFs. The criteria highlighted in green indicates the correlation with 6 of the 11 ENISA SME attributes. 
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Au IT 
Security 
Handbook 
Austria        N/A   
A&K 
Analysis 
The 
Netherlands 
          
Ebios France           
ISO/IEC IS 
13335-2  
(ISO/IEC IS 
27005) 
International 
standard 
  
 
     N/A   
ISO/IEC IS 
17799 
(ISO/IEC IS 
27002) 
International 
standard 
       N/A   
 
IT-
Grundschutz  
Germany           
Mehari France           
Octave USA        N/A N/A  
Table 1 Suitability of risk assessment approach for ACF case study 
 
The result of the review indicated that the Octave method and the ISO 27002 standard were the 2 most suitable 
methods that match the defined suitability criteria. The challenge was then to combine elements from both these 
methods to create and validate an agile risk management approach. The next sections provide further description 
and justification for the selection of these methods. 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation) 
The OCTAVE methodology was created by Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute. 
OCTAVE is a popular, industry standard methodology that identifies a company’s critical IT assets, 
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vulnerabilities and threats to those assets and develops a risk mitigation system to support the company’s 
mission and priorities. Traditionally a self-directed approach, OCTAVE draws its strengths from members of 
the organisation itself, utilising their knowledge of organisational operations and giving them responsibility for 
applying the security strategy. OCTAVE is a very thorough method and allows a company to understand what 
potential risks, threats and vulnerabilities there are to its critical assets. The OCTAVE method is also quite 
flexible and can be tailored to meet the IT and business requirements of various types of companies. (Carnegie 
Mellon University, 2014a). This methodology is best suited for use by large companies with sufficient 
budgetary and people resources to undertake its development and implementation. It contains a lot of 
unnecessary testing and information regarding elements of a large business that a SME such as ACF does not 
have (Violino, 2011).  
OCTAVE-s 
OCTAVE-s is a variation of the OCTAVE approach to risk management specifically aimed at the requirements 
and constraints facing smaller organisations of approximately 100 employees or less. OCTAVE-s analyses can 
be led by small teams, typically 3-5 interdepartmental members with detailed knowledge of the inner workings 
of the organisation. These personnel will collect and analyse key asset, systems and information and produce 
protection strategies and risk mitigation plans based on the organisations’ unique security risks. OCTAVE-s 
evaluations are performed more quickly and effectively when the team involved has a broad and detailed 
understanding of current business and security policies and procedures. All required tasks may then be 
completed internally and in a timely manner (Carnegie Mellon University, 2014b). 
 
The OCTAVE-s methodology is a smaller and more concise version of the previously mentioned OCTAVE 
methodology. This version of the methodology is more suited to SMEs as it allows a smaller working group and 
takes into consideration the fact that smaller companies will have smaller and less hierarchies. This 
methodology simplifies and removes some sections from the original OCTAVE methodology, providing a more 
straightforward way to analyse a small business while still retaining the key assessment criteria of the original 
methodology. 
ISMS family of standards – ISO27k 
The ISMS family of standards is intended to assist organizations of all types and sizes to implement and operate 
an ISMS (Information Security Management System) to manage the security of their information assets, and 
currently consists of 15 International standards under the general title of information technology – Security 
techniques (ISO/IEC, 2014). A company certified to ISO27k means that it follows an established and verified 
information security framework, and is compliant with the ISO/IEC 27001 Information security management 
systems — Requirements standard as determined by an independent assessment of their ISMS applied to the 
protection of information (ISO/IEC, 2014). Due to current resource including time and cost constraints, it is not 
feasible for ACF to consider ISO27001 certification. This is consistent with the ENISA omission of ISO/IEC 
27001 from their recommended methods best suited for SMEs.  However Annex A of ISO/IEC 27001 includes 
a set of control objectives and controls directly derived from and aligned with those listed in ISO/IEC 27002 
Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls to be used 
as implementation guidance when selecting and implementing controls for achieving information security 
(ISO/IEC, 2014). As identified by the review and supported by ENISA, this guideline standard is suitable for 
use by SMEs and therefore provides ACF with a method on which to build an ISMS if they seek to become 
certified in the future.  
Methodology choice and justification 
Based on the results of the review, and in consultation with management of the ACF, it was discussed which 
method would best benefit the assessment current IT assets. It was clear that the OCTAVE methodology would 
be cumbersome requiring too many unnecessary tests regarding ACF IT systems. The OCTAVE-s methodology 
provided the best-fit as it retains most of the threat assessment that the OCTAVE methodology contains but is 
more tailored towards the smaller company being studied. The organisation has a staff population of less than 
100 employees and a small but quickly growing information technology infrastructure. This is significant, as the 
full OCTAVE analysis requires a detailed technical review of IT infrastructure. Small organisations often 
outsource their IT services and therefore do not have the technical knowledge or analysis tools required to 
evaluate their security effectively. A major benefit of the OCTAVE-s methodology is it can be tailored to a 
small company who outsources their IT assistance (Carnegie Mellon University, 2014b), similar to the way the 
ACF does for the management of their IT infrastructure. OCTAVE-s also suits the goal established by ACF to 
focus review efforts on securing key information technology assets, as this is an asset-based risk profiling 
technique. 
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 It was decided to use the OCTAVE-s method as the process to develop a report on the steps performed to 
define, assess and provide feedback for this ACFs’ current security issues. As the only other method supported 
by the review, the ISO 27002 control objectives and controls could be applied as a compliance checklist to help 
build the threat based profiles and determine the severity of risks posed to ACFs’ IT assets. The checklist covers 
11 key aspects of IT security, including asset management, physical security, access controls, and legal 
compliance. The accompanying risk assessment matrix provided by the ISO27k forum (ISO27k, 2007) can be 
used to score and rank each of the identified threats to determine which posed the greatest risk to ACF. 
THE AGILE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH         
This section describes the development of the agile risk management approach. 
Establishing an impact evaluation criteria 
Although traditionally qualitative in nature, presenting risk impact categories to an organisation using values of 
high, medium, and low has some limitations. Within these categories, it becomes difficult to determine where 
the more significant risks exist. Supposing there are multiple risks all deemed to be high impact in nature, where 
should management first focus their attention? The aim became to integrate traditional OCTAVE layout and 
analysis approaches with a more concise and definitive impact criteria to supplement OCTAVE findings and 
provide more indication to ACF management of exactly which risks posed the greatest impact to business 
objectives.  
 
It is also important to note which areas of impact ACF management believed to be of greatest concern. It was 
established that losses or compromises causing time loss or business reputation damage were to be the primary 
focus. The criteria utilised to evaluate the impact of risks to ACF IT assets were adapted from resources 
provided by the ISO27k forum detailed in table 2 (ISO27k forum, 2007, 2008, 2010). 
 
 
Probability Explanation Score 
Negligible Unlikely to occur 0 
Very Low 2 – 3 times every 5 years 1 
Low Up to once per year 2 
Medium Up to twice per year 3 
High Up to once per month 4 
Very High More than once per month 5 
Extreme Several times per week 6 
 
Impact Level Explanation Score 
Insignificant No impact 0 
Minor No extra effort required to repair 1 
Significant Tangible harm, extra effort 
required to repair 
2 
Damaging Significant expenditure of 
resources required 
Damaging to reputation and 
confidence 
3 
Serious Extended outage and/or loss of 
connectivity 
Compromise of large amounts of 
data or services 
4 
Grave Permanent shutdown 
Complete compromise of data or 
services 
5 
 
Risk Detection Likelihood of Detection Score 
Extremely High Very obvious or easy to detect 1 
High Relatively easy to detect, quite 
noticeable 
2 
Medium Can be detected, additional efforts 3 
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are required 
Low Difficult to detect, quite likely to 
remain hidden 
4 
Extremely Low Exceedingly difficult (almost 
impossible) to detect. Almost 
certain to remain hidden 
5 
Table 2 Risk impact criteria 
 
A Risk Probability Number (RPN) is determined by the product of probability, impact and risk detection: RPN 
equation: RPN = Probability x Impact x Risk Detection (ISO27k forum, 2012). The resulting value between 0 
and 150 is used to determine the severity of the identified threat. 
 
The significance of this equation is that converted risk levels may be reduced to zero if either impact or 
probability of the risk is scored at zero. Regardless of other variables in this calculation, if the threat is unlikely 
to ever occur or the impact to the business following this occurrence is negligible, there is no need for any 
action by business management to mitigate the risk. 
 
Ordering risks by these values enables management to quickly and easily prioritise their resources, ensuring that 
risks with the greatest severity are addressed first. These values are subsequently converted into a qualitative 
range in accordance with the OCTAVE approach, providing directed focus of security issues surrounding 
critical assets. The qualitative conversion and result definitions present the agile risk management approach as 
outlined in table 3. 
 
RPN Value Converted Risk Level Definitions 
0 Negligible / No Risk Negligible to no potential for impact on business 
objectives and/or reputation. 
No additional controls or procedural changes required 
unless a significant cost benefit exists in line with business 
objectives.  
1 – 10 Very Low Risk Limited potential for impact on business objectives and/or 
reputation. 
Additional controls or procedural changes only required if 
a cost benefit exists in line with business objectives. 
10 – 20 Low Risk Potential for minor impact on business objectives and/or 
reputation. 
Management to identify if a cost benefit exists in 
establishing improved controls or procedural changes. 
20 – 40 Medium Risk Potential for unfavourable or negative impact on business 
objectives and/or reputation. 
Management consideration recommended establishing 
viable risk controls or procedure changes in accordance 
with business objectives. 
40 – 60 High Risk Potential for unfavourable or noticeable negative impact 
on business objectives and/or reputation. 
Prompt consideration recommended to ensure risk is 
managed in accordance with business objectives. 
60 + Very High Risk Potential for significant negative impact on business 
objectives and/or reputation. 
Immediate consideration is required to ensure risk is 
managed in accordance with business objectives. 
Table 3 Agile risk management approach 
APPLICATION OF AGILE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
This section describes the application of the agile risk management approach to the ACF case study.  
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Selection of Critical Assets 
Critical assets are those identified to be of highest important to ACF operations. The organisation will suffer 
significant adverse impacts in the following situations: 
 A critical asset or its data is disclosed to unauthorised individuals; 
 A critical asset or its data is modified without appropriate authorisation; 
 A critical asset or its data is significantly damaged, lost or destroyed; 
 Access to a critical asset or its data is impeded; 
In consultation with ACF management it was decided that the analysis would centre on the following critical 
applications and systems: 
 Application A – application controlling and storing key information surrounding the administration 
of medications and care requirements for clients. 
 Application B – application controlling and storing personal information for clients, including care 
records, contact information and billing information.   
 Application C – application used by management and payroll personnel to direct cash flow to and 
from debtors and creditors of the organisation. 
 Application D – application used by management and payroll personnel to manage staff rosters 
and payments for work logged. 
 Application E – application used by management and payroll personnel to create and dispatch 
billing information to clients. 
The majority of assets selected by management of this ACF were key business applications. Downtime, loss of 
data or compromise of any of the applications listed or their data would hinder business function and therefore 
prove a risk. 
Identification of Threats to Critical Assets 
Security evaluations utilising the OCTAVE-s framework are typically completed internally by personnel who 
are intimately familiar with information technology security systems, infrastructure and policies. Identification 
of threats to critical assets involved conducting 2 workshops with ACF and EIP management. The focus of the 
first workshop was the identification of threats to critical assets following the OCTAVE-s approach. The second 
workshop concentrated on the evaluation of the threat probabilities. These workshops were facilitated by the 
researchers while the ACF staff responsible for the selected applications and systems were the decision makers. 
 
In order to identify potential threats to the selected assets, each asset was cross-referenced with each control of 
the ISO 27002 security compliance checklist. A threat was found to be applicable where ACF did not have a 
control in place to protect the asset, and subsequently added to the worksheet of identified threats. Upon 
examining the compliance checklist once for each of the critical assets, the potential threats were identified and 
organised by asset for quantifiable evaluation. The next step in applying the agile risk management approach 
was calculating the RPN values using the risk impact criteria calculation for each identified threat. Utilising the 
equation RPN = Probability x Impact x Risk Detection, the researchers ranked the identified threats in order of 
importance based on subjective understanding of the potential risk to each of the ACF assets. In this way they 
could be presented to ACF management and EIP representatives for evaluation of their probability, impact and 
risk of non-detection. 
Evaluation of Threat Probabilities 
During the second workshop, the probability scores were reviewed and amended based on input from ACF and 
EIP management regarding their perspective on the severity of each threat to the IT assets. This collaboration 
provided valuable insight for ACF by revealing and sharing the detailed knowledge of organisational policies, 
procedures and infrastructure possessed by these individuals. 
 
The existing security measures implemented by this ACF which affected the selected critical assets were 
considered and evaluated when finalising the probability scores. The ACF had a variety of protection measures 
including acceptable use policies, password policies and various types of protection for its IT systems. Some 
applications had additional security measures in place while general security practices and protocols were in 
place for all users of the ACF information technology infrastructure. This information was then used to 
prioritise the identified risks for ACF. The second workshop concluded with the successful review of threat 
probabilities with both ACF and EIP agreeing on what the most significant risks were to the IT assets. To 
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complete the process of the OCTAVE-s methodology, a protection strategy and mitigation plan for each of these 
risks could now be recommended. 
PROTECTION STRATEGY AND MITIGATION PLANS 
At this point in the analysis process, scenarios which posed significant risk to critical ACF assets due to the 
potential for loss of integrity, availability or confidentiality of data had been established and ranked in order of 
significance. Recommendations were proposed to ACF management and EIP personnel. Recommendations 
were aimed at improving the security of each asset in one of three fields; probability of occurrence, impact on 
the organisations functions and chance of non-detection. A reduction in any of these fields would reduce the 
overall risk outcome and the chance of damage to the organisation through compromise of that asset. 
 
An example of recommendations included in the report to ACF to improve security for a key critical asset based 
on applying the agile approach is provided in table 4. A detailed risk analysis of all recommendations made in 
relation to this asset and policy was provided to the ACF and EIP management. 
 
 
Observations Several issues have been identified regarding the way in which medical and patient 
care applications are accessed: 
 
 terminals are located in easily accessible areas and several are in public and 
unobstructed locations; 
 terminals are often unmonitored by staff or surveillance equipment; 
 staff members are known to share and/or physically record access 
passwords; 
 complexity of passwords encourages recording of passwords by staff 
members; 
 terminals are often left logged on due to complexity of passwords and time 
taken for login process to be completed; 
 no timeout feature exists. Screen saver is displayed after 5 minutes of 
inactivity, preventing sensitive information from being displayed, however 
this will not prevent access to the information if someone attempts to access 
the terminal. No automated logout feature currently exists. 
Potential Threat With terminals often left vacant by staff in easily accessible locations, accessing 
Application B without authorisation would be a relatively simple task. Obtaining 
login credentials is also a possibility while staff members continue to freely record 
and share login details. Access could compromise resident confidentiality and allow 
unauthorised theft, alteration or deletion of key medical and personal information. 
Recommendations  Short term – Revised computer use and password protection policies emphasising 
immediate logout from Application B terminals and prohibiting password sharing 
and physical recording. Introduction of automated logouts after periods of inactivity 
will ensure no information can be obtained by unauthorised personnel in the event 
that a staff member fails to log off. Re-education of staff to ensure proper password 
procedures are known and adhered to. Mandatory password complexity and regular 
password changes required of all authorised personnel. 
 
Long term – Introduction of RFID or equivalent login cards for all medical personnel 
to access Application B workstations. This removes the need for staff to remember 
passwords and can introduce an immediate logoff procedure following the 
completion of staff access, as logging in again becomes a simple task of swiping a 
unique staff identification card.  This alternative would improve application security 
significantly more than policy change/amendment, though due to its cost, 
establishment time and maintenance requirements, it is proposed as a long-term 
possible solution. 
Table 4 Application B – Unauthorised access and / or authentication – Risk Level: Very High 
CONCLUSION 
What has been developed and presented in this paper is not just an assessment of the ACF IT infrastructure and 
security practices in relation to key critical assets, but a streamlined process, the results of which can be utilised 
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by ACF to prioritise their IT security direction. The agile risk management approach can be applied to future IT 
infrastructure developments within this ACF and other SMEs. 
  
ACF management can reapply the matrix used during this analysis to track improvements in their security 
infrastructure and gain an understanding of what improvements may be required in the future as their IT 
infrastructure (and the organisation) continues to expand. 
 
The combination of ISO27k threat assessment categories combined with the condensed assessment framework 
of the OCTAVE-s risk assessment framework to analyse a specific asset creates a unique, versatile and reusable 
methodology with quantifiable results for future assessments. 
There are potentially some improvements to be made to further streamline the assessment process. The number 
of ISO27k threat categories can be reduced for future assessments, as certain categories are not, and will not in 
the future, be applicable to IT assets. This would reduce the time required to properly perform the analysis, 
although care must be taken as threat categories may be overlooked. 
The RPN value scale on which assets are ranked from very low to very high threat may also need to be refined. 
Currently, any threat from 60-150 (theoretical maximum value) represents a very high risk of compromise to the 
critical asset. With the addition of future data from other organisations or other critical assets, these RPN values 
could be normalised to form a bell-shape curve, where only the top 5% of threats (for example) represent a very 
high risk. 
 
Ideally, framework templates may also be established for common asset categories, such as applications, 
databases, and common infrastructure components. This refers back to ISO27k categories which would or 
would not be appropriate to specific asset types. Having templates in place with these categories already 
selected would enable the analysis process to proceed much faster for each asset, as the ISO27k compliance 
checklist would not need to be analysed in its entirety each time an asset is to be evaluated. 
 
The agile approach developed for the ACF utilised internationally recognised security methods and provides 
them with a solid foundation upon which to base analyses for potential future security risks. By addressing the 
threats we have outlined, the ACF will have moved closer to ISO certification if it were to become a future IT 
development goal for the organisation, and considerably reduced much of the time, effort and uncertainty 
associated with future assessments.  
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